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Richard W. Garnett2 
If nothing else, this Review Essay, like Professor Viteritti's 
book, should be timely. As I write, the United States Supreme 
Court in Mitchell v. Helms3 has just decided that publicly funded 
computers and other educational materials may be loaned to 
private and religious schools. The decision is widely viewed as 
signaling, if not determining, the constitutional fate of school-
choice experiments like those in Cleveland and Milwaukee.4 As 
it happened, just one week before Mitchell, the Sixth Circuit 
heard oral arguments in Simmons-Harris v. Zelman5 (the Ohio 
voucher case) as hundreds of voucher supporters chanted "free-
dom, freedom!" across the street from the federal court in down-
town Cincinnati.6 A challenge to Florida's statewide voucher 
1. Research Professor of Public Administration, Wagner School of Public Service, 
New York University. 
2. Assistant Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I'm grateful to Brendan 
Gardiner and Fred Marczyk for their assistance with this and other projects, and to 
Gerard Bradley, James Dwyer, Nicole Garnett, Steffen Johnson, William Kelley, John 
Nagle, Michael Paulsen, Steven Smith, and Eugene Volokh for their comments and criti-
cisms. Richard Garnett can be contacted at <rick.garnett.4@nd.edu>. 
3. 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
4. See, e.g., Jodi Wilgoren, Court Ruling Fuels Debate on Vouchers for Education, 
N.Y. Times A21 (June 29, 2000); Chester E. Finn, Jr., and Charles R. Hokanson, Jr., 
Court Ruling Augurs Well for Vouchers, Wall. St. J. A26 (June 29, 2000). 
5. The author of this Review Essay helped write the amicus curiae brief filed by 
the Center for Education Reform in support of the Cleveland choice program. 
6. Francis Griggs and Sharon Moloney, While Lawyers Arguing, Rally Touts 
School Choice, Cin. Post 7A (June 21, 2000). In Zelman, Ohio is asking the Court of 
Appeals to reverse a district-court ruling that the Ohio Pilot Scholarship Program vio-
lates the Establishment Clause. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. 
Ohio 1999). Just before this Essay went to press, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision in Zelman, reasoning that the Cleveland school-
choice program "has the primary effect of advancing religion and that it constitutes an 
endorsement of religion and sectarian education in violation of the Establishment 
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program is pending before a state appeals court, and choice pro-
posals will be on the ballot this November in Michigan and Cali-
fornia.7 It is, one activist reports, "High Noon" for vouchers.8 
Enter Joseph Viteritti ( cue spaghetti-western-style, ominously 
poignant whistling), who has written a readable and reasonable, 
measured yet inspiring, argument for educational choice.9 
I 
"Vouchers" is, for many liberals and progressives, a dirty 
word; such a nasty word, in fact, that when the Vice President 
and his campaign staff were making the talk-show rounds last 
winter to critique Senator Bradley's health-care plan, they were 
careful to note, over and again, their horror barely concealed, 
that Bradley was proposing "vouchers."10 What's more-as was 
illustrated last February during the Bradley-Gore debate at the 
Apollo Theater-it is evidently thought to be politically safer to 
risk snubbing the many African American parents who favor 
school choice than even to appear sympathetic to voucher pro-
posals.11 
Clause." Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 961 (6th Cir. 2000). In my view, the 
Sixth Circuit's ruling coheres neither with controlling precedent nor common sense, and 
should be reviewed and reversed by the United States Supreme Court. Sec, e.g., Judg-
ment Day, Wash. Post A26 (Dec. 18, 2000) {"The good news is that no one, least of all 
the court itself, really expects this to be the last word"). 
7. Editorial, School Is Out, Wall St. J. A46 (June 26, 2000). As this Essay is going 
to press, the protracted 2000 presidential election has finally ended, and voters in Michi-
gan and California resoundingly rejected the school-choice initiatives proposed in those 
states. See, e.g., Voters Approved School-Funding Proposals in Referendum Voting, Wall 
St. J. A17 (Nov. 9, 2000) ("By more than 3-to-l, ... voters in California and Michigan 
turned down proposals that would have committed their states to offering school vouch-
ers"). 
8. Ron Unz, High Noon for Vouchers, Nat'! Rev. Online, June 20, 2000 ("Now, 
suddenly, a chain of unconnected events will decide the triumph or collapse of the 
voucher movement-by the end of the year") (see <http://www.nationalrcvicw.com> ). 
9. Professor Viteritti has developed these ideas in earlier works. Sec generally 
Joseph P. Viteritti, Reaching For Equality: The Salience of School Choice, 14 J.L. & Pol. 
469 (1998); Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, The First Amendment, and 
State Constitutional Law, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 657 (1998); Joseph P. Vitcritti, Choos-
ing Equality: Religious Freedom and Educational Opportunity Under Constitutional Fed-
eralism, 15 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 113 (1996). 
10. Debra J. Saunders, Gore Masters Psychological Warfare, S.F. Chron. A25 (Jan. 
28, 1999) ("In debate after debate, Gore hit Bradley's 'voucher' plan that was 'capped' at 
$150 per month. It was a double misrepresentation. The Bradley plan would operate 
through tax credits, not vouchers-a loaded word among Democrats who might hear the 
word and think school vouchers"). 
11. During the Apollo Theater debate, one journalist asked the Vice President, 
given that so many African Americans support school choice and that the Vice President 
and his children are products of private schools, "why should ... parents (who support 
vouchers] have to keep their kids in public schools because they don't have the financial 
2000] BROWN'S PROMISE, BLAINE'S LEGACY 653 
This makes no sense to Joseph Viteritti, an "old school" lib-
eral who offers in Choosing Equality what some might call a 
"bleeding heart" argument for choice in education. The book 
opens not with a libertarian nugget from Hayek or the Cato In-
stitute; and not with red-meat-for-conservatives anecdotes about 
mandatory condom-distribution programs, Gaia worship, or 
public-school secularism run amok; but instead with the story of 
Linda Brown: "Nearly half a century has passed since the par-
ents of a little black girl from Topeka, Kansas, entered a federal 
court room to argue that every child in America has an equal 
right to a decent education." (p. 1) Still, "[n]otwithstanding 
Linda Brown's courageous efforts to fulfill the promise of equal-
ity and a range of well-intentioned government actions, race and 
class remain the most reliable predictors of educational 
achievement in the United States." (Id.) This, Viteritti insists, is 
the "most compelling argument" for school choice. (p. 223) 
Viteritti admits, of course, that there are many reasons why 
people support ( and oppose) school choice.12 When Milton 
Friedman first proposed a "full-fledged system of school vouch-
ers" that "would minimize the role of government in education 
and replace public schools with privately run institutions sup-
ported bl taxes," (p. 53) many libertarians cheered, and many 
still do.1 In the early 1970s, progressive social scientists like 
Christopher Jencks, John Coons, and Stephen Sugarman turned 
to vouchers as an income-redistribution and empowerment de-
vice,14 themes that many education-reform and civil-rights activ-
ists still invoke today. 15 And more recently, many religious con-
servatives have embraced school choice as a way to challenge 
resources that you do?" Another questioner inquired of both candidates, why shouldn't 
parents conclude that the Democratic Party's opposition to choice is supporting a special 
interest rather than their interest?" Both candidates were unmoved. See Editorial, No 
Choice for Democrats, Wall St. J. A22 (Feb. 23, 2000); see also Floyd H. Flake, Gore's 
Achilles Heel, N.Y. Times A15 (Mar. 12, 2000) (claiming that "Mr. Gore did not answer 
[the] question in any real way. That won't do"). 
12. For a fairly representative snapshot of the debate, see Gary Rosen, Are School 
Vouchers Un-American?, Commentary 26, Feb. 2000; Gary Rosen & Critics, Are School 
Vouchers the Answer?, Commentary 16, June 2000. 
13. Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in Robert A. Solo, ed., 
Economics and the Public Interest (Greenwood Press, 1955). 
14. See, e.g., Christopher Jencks, Education Vouchers: A Report on Financing Edu-
cation by Payments to Parents (1970); John E. Coons, William H. Clune and Stephen D. 
Sugarman, Private Wealth and Public Education (Belknap Press, 1970); John E. Coons 
and Stephen D. Sugarman, Family Choice in Education: A Model State System for 
Vouchers, 59 Cal. L. Rev. 321 (1971). 
15. See, e.g., Floyd H. Flake, How Do We Save Inner-City Children?, Pol'y Rev. 48 
(Jan-Feb. 1999). 
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what they regard as the increasingly aggressive secularism of the 
public schools' curriculum and culture. (pp. 56-57) 
The leitmotif of Choosing Equality, though, is Linda 
Brown's lawsuit, and the book's animating goal is to "explain 
how choice might be applied ... to advance the goal of equal-
ity." (p. 2) In Viteritti's view, Brown promised "not only equal-
ity of educational opportunity for blacks, but full partnership in 
the American experiment." (p. 3) He aims to show that school 
choice holds out the best hope for making good on that promise. 
And he suggests that, given the support for choice programs 
among those to whom the Brown Court most clearly made its 
pledge, (pp. 5-9)16 it is appropriate to place the burden of per-
suasion on those who oppose such reforms. As one of Viteritti's 
apparent converts put it, "[a]s a parent of an urban public high-
school student, I flinch at anything that drains resources from 
public schools. But I have a choice. Keeping them from others 
because of a vague threat seems increasingly hard to justify."17 
Choosing Equality is about a big idea-"equality." In the 
legal academy, though, school-choice discussions tend to focus 
on the fine points and various "prongs" of First Amendment 
doctrine and "tests." And so, one could be forgiven for thinking 
of the book, "Not another tour through the Supreme Court's Es-
tablishment Clause mess?" Fear not. Choosing Equality is an 
engaging contribution both to the education-reform arena and to 
the broader dialogue about the place of religion and religious in-
stitutions in public life. Particularly in a political season, the case 
for (and against) choice in education can too easily "morph" into 
partisan posturing and interest-group gamesmanship. In 
Viteritti's view, it doesn't have to be this way. For him, school 
16. Low-income citizens and racial minorities are more likely to support choice in 
education than are middle- and high-income whites. See, e.g., David A. Bositis, 1999 Na-
tional Opinion Poll: Education, Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, at Table 
5 (available at <http://www.jointcenter.org/selpaper/poll_edu99.htm>); Jeff Jacoby, The 
Poor Favor School Choice, Boston Globe A19 (Dec. 27, 1999); Michael W. Lynch, Ram-
paging Toward Choice, Reason 24, 26 (Jan. 2000) ("Polls show that school choice is far 
more popular with minorities than with whites, and most popular with low- and modest-
income minorities"); James Brooke, Minorities Flock to Cause of Vouchers for Schools, 
N.Y. Times Al (Dec. 27, 1997). But sec William Raspberry, A Little Knowledge Can Be 
a Meaningless Thing, Wash. Post A23 (Nov. 29, 1999) (suggesting that parents' support 
for school-choice is generally uninformed). 
17. Geneva Overholser, Coming Around on Vouchers, Wash. Post A15 (Sept. 20, 
1999) ("It's getting harder every day to be an informed and compassionate opponent of 
vouchers. A new book called 'Choosing Equality' just may spell the end of my opposi-
tion"). 
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choice makes sense as a matter of shared constitutional and 
moral ideals that are too important to be left to political junkies. 
Here is Viteritti's argument, in a nutshell: First, the Brown 
decision was not just about de-segregating public schools; it also 
held out the more ambitious promise of meaningful racial equal-
ity in society. After Brown, Viteritti insists, equal educational 
opQortunity should be regarded as a fundamental right. (pp. 23-
28) 1 s 
Second, fifty years of government-centered tinkering and 
several hundred billion dollars in well-intentioned spending have 
failed to make good on Brown's promise. It's time, Viteritti 
thinks, to try something else. (pp. 28-52) 
Third, choice-based reforms are often hamstrung by exces-
sive regulatory controls. Magnet schools, charter schools, and 
public-school-only choice programs are clearly steps in the right 
direction, but they are not likely to capture the full creative po-
tential of educational choice. (pp. 53-79) 
Fourth, religious schools-particularly Catholic schools-
are the key to school choice. These schools equip disadvantaged 
children for success in educational environments that are more 
integrated, diverse, and consonant with the best of our common-
school ideals than are many of the public schools that purport to 
serve the same children. (pp. 80-116) 
Fifth, the Constitution permits governments to include reli-
gious schools in school-choice programs. Indeed, inclusive 
school-choice programs better serve the religious-freedom val-
ues at the heart of the First Amendment than does strict "no-aid 
separationism,"19 and they avoid the discrimination against relig-
ion that is no less offensive to the Constitution than is state-
sponsored orthodoxy. (pp.117-44) 
Sixth, the strict no-funding provisions that were injected 
into many States' constitutions during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries-in large part as a result of nativist 
prejudices and suspicions toward the Catholic Church20 -are the 
more formidable obstacles to school choice. A re-appraisal of 
18. But cf. San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S 1 (1973) (education 
not a "fundamental right" under the Equal Protection Clause). 
19. See, e.g., Carl Es beck, Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-Aid Separation-
ism and the Establishment Clause, 13 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 285 (1999). 
20. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 2000 WL 826246, at *24 (2000) (plurality 
opinion) ("Consideration of the [Blaine] Amendment arose at a time of pervasive hostil-
ity to the Catholic Church and Catholics in general"). 
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these provisions, their history, their continuing discriminatory 
effects, and of the common-school movement itself, is needed. 
(pp. 145-79) 
Seventh, school choice will not only promote educational 
equality but also enrich the public square.2 Far from being bal-
kanizing or insular, many neighborhood parochial and private 
schools are valuable participants in the enterprise of creating 
public-minded citizens, healthy mediating institutions, and a 
thriving civil society. (pp. 180-208)22 
Eighth, and finally, Viteritti proposes that governments im-
plement broad choice programs for low-income children in fail-
ing public schools. These programs should include religious 
schools (while requiring that these schools not discriminate on 
the basis of race or religion in admissions) and at the same time 
require that government-run schools remain secular. (pp. 209-
24) In the end, Viteritti concludes, 
As with all crucial political issues, choice is a moral 
question. It speaks to who we are as a people and to our 
capacity to think beyond ourselves. The most compel-
ling argument for school choice in America remains an 
egalitarian one: education is such an essential public 
good for living life in a free and prosperous society that 
all people deserve equal access to its benefits regardless 
of race, class, or philosophical disposition. There should 
be no exceptions to the rule or excuses for the contrary. 
(p. 223) 
II 
Viteritti observes early on in Choosing Equality that "dis-
cussions on the merits of school choice operate on two different 
levels. As intellectuals engage in esoteric discourse on the ab-
stractions of distributive justice, market dynamics, religious lib-
erty, and civil society, the poor understand on a more visceral 
level that it is their children who are trapped in inferior schools." 
21. See generally Richard John Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square: Religion and 
Democracy in America (W.B. Eerdmans, 1984). 
22. See generally, e.g., Paul E. Peterson, School Choice: A Report Card, 6 Va. J. 
Soc. Pol'y & L. 47, 72-73 (1998) ("Despite the rhetoric and scare tactics, choice critics 
have failed to offer much evidence that school choice will balkanize America"); Christian 
Smith and David Sikkink, Is Private School Privatizing?, First Things 16 (April 1999); Jay 
P. Greene, Civic Values in Public and Private Schools, in Paul E. Peterson & Bryan C. 
Hassel, eds., Learning from School Choice 83, 95-98 (Brookings Institution Press, 1998). 
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(p. 11) In fact, "choice already exists for many if not most 
Americans" and "those who do not enjoy choice really want it 
for their own children." (pp. 11-12) Choosing Equality asks, 
given these givens, whether school choice is something that those 
who want it should want; whether it is something the Constitu-
tion permits government to provide; and whether it is something 
that, in light of our Constitution and democratic ideals, we 
should be eager to embrace. In other words, is school choice 
sensible? Is it constitutional? Is it just? 
Having identified "equality" -as opposed to, say, "effi-
ciency," "competition," or "family values" -as the school-choice 
endgame, Viteritti reviews nearly fifty years of post-Brown poli-
cymakers' efforts first to define and then to achieve that equal-
ity. (pp. 23-52) The story is familiar and depressing.23 Although 
Viteritti does not downplay the achievement of outlawing de jure 
segregation, it remains true that, hundreds of billions of dollars 
later, "most children who attend public school in the United 
States today do so in a segregated setting" (p. 49) and black and 
Latino students persistently lag behind whites in academic per-
formance. If Brown's aim was to "realize racial equality through 
educational opportunity. How this promise might be translated 
into concrete public policy turned out to be a more daunting 
challenge than anyone at the time could have imagined." (p. 27) 
What went wrong? Choosing Equality traces several "false 
starts" (p. 28) at "realizing racial equality," starting with the tu-
multuous implementation of the Court's "all deliberate speed" 
mandate, continuing through the attempts to remedy the effects 
of segregation through busing, and turning then. to the gradual 
retreat in the legislatures and in the courts from court supervi-
sion of school districts as a school-reform tool. (pp. 29-34)24 
Viteritti reports that, in the mid-1970s, researcher James Cole-
man concluded that the government's desegregation efforts were 
actually increasing segregation (by prompting "white flight") 
without corresponding gains in student performance.25 And by 
23. For provocative and quite different take on this problem, see James Traub, 
What No School Can Do, N.Y. Times (Magazine) 52, 54 (Jan. 16, 2000) ("[E]ducational 
inequality is rooted in economic problems and social pathologies too deep to be over-
come by school alone"). 
24. See, e.g., Board of Education v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991); Freeman v. Pitts, 
503 U.S. 467 (1992); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
25. James S. Coleman, et al., Trends in School Desegregation 1968-1973 (Urban In-
stitute, 1975). 
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1998, "80 percent of black parents said that they would prefer 
schools to focus on achievement rather than integration." (p. 33) 
Just as efforts to achieve "equality as racial integration" fiz-
zled, so too did attempts at "equality as more spending" (pp. 34-
42) and "equality as political power." {pp. 42-49)26 The "im-
mense outpouring" of "well intentioned" dollars that began with 
the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act "did not 
prove to be effective in closing the achievement gap for disad-
vantaged children." {p. 35)27 Nor has the "equal money" ap-
proach worked much better than the "more money" strategy. In 
1973, the Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez turned back an effort to constitutionalize-
through the Equal Protection Clause-parity in public-school 
funding.28 In so doing, though, the Court inspired state-law-
based equal-funding litigation in at least thirty-three States. This 
litigation continues today and has resulted in substantial change 
in the way many States fund public education. (pp. 37-42)29 
Still, "the preponderance of the research evidence continues to 
support the findings that Coleman uncovered more than thirty 
years ago: there is no consistent relationshi~ between education 
spending and student achievement." (p. 42) 0 
26. Viteritti describes in some detail the Great Society's "Community Action Pro-
gram," which was designed to "bypass the traditional governmental institutions elected 
citywide and to funnel money directly into communities where new units of power, 
elected by community residents, determined how resources [were] to be disbursed." (p. 
44) 
27. One 1997 study concluded that over one hundred billion dollars in Title I spend-
ing had failed to produce "any difference in performance between program participants 
and a control group." (p. 35) As Viteritti notes, however, Title I was hamstrung for 
more than a decade by the Supreme Court's decision in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 
(1985), which held that public-school teachers could not provide federally funded reme-
dial education on parochial-school grounds. The Court abandoned Aguilar in Agostini v. 
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
28. 411 U.S 1 (1973). The California Supreme Court had held, in Serrano v. Priest, 
5 Cal. 3d 584 (1971), that California's school-funding system discriminated against the 
poor. But the Supreme Court in Rodriguez insisted that "the Equal Protection Clause 
does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages" in education. 411 U.S. 
at 24. Viteritti believes that Serrano was a "reasonable interpretation of the U.S. Consti-
tution in the wake of Brown, which had deemed equality of opportunity a fundamental 
right" and concludes that, in Rodriguez, the Court "appeared to be stepping back from 
Brown." (p. 37) 
29. The school-funding cases have also prompted vigorous debates over the point" 
[at which] redistributive politics carried out in the name of equity begin to bunk up 
against the liberty and property rights of those who are required to make a greater per-
sonal sacrifice." (p. 39) On school-funding litigation generally, see, e.g., James E. Ryan, 
Schools, Race, and Money, 109 Yale L.J. 249 (1999). 
30. See Traub, What No School Can Do at 55 (cited in note 23) ("Head Start, Title 
I and a host of other programs have gone a long way toward proving one of Coleman's 
central claims, which is that money does not buy educational equality"). 
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And so, Viteritti concludes, notwithstanding half a century 
of experiments with political decentralization, new spending 
programs, school-funding reform, and busing, the answer to the 
"crucial question" - "whether [our] children are adequately 
learning" -is, at least with respect to the most disadvantaged, 
disappointing but clear: "Our public schools have failed misera-
bly." (p. 51) 
So, what about choice? Viteritti traces the evolution of the 
school-choice idea from Milton Friedman's 1955 universal-
voucher proposal through the current debates in Milwaukee, 
Cleveland, Congress, and the courts. Friedman favored public 
education but was "troubled by the dominance of a government-
run bureaucracy in education that he believed perpetuated me-
diocrity." (p. 53) Although he spoke out of a philosophical tra-
dition that claims not to be concerned with equality of results 
and that purports to tolerate only a minimalist state, Friedman 
(like Viteritti) "was unequivocal in his position that government 
had an obligation to provide decent schooling to all at public ex-
pense." (p. 54) He understood that "without fostering equality 
in educational outcomes, there could be no real equality of op-
portunity in a larger social context." (emphasis added) (pp. 55) 
"Education" was for Friedman "the irreplaceable link that ties 
the two together, an essential ingredient for both liberty and 
equality in a democratic society." (p. 55)31 Friedman's market 
libertarianism, oddly enough, can therefore be seen as not only 
contemporaneous but also consonant with the ideals expressed 
in Brown. 
But Friedman was ahead of his time. Although a few social 
scientists embraced vouchers in the late 1960s and 1970s as part 
of ambitious redistributive programs, (pp. 55-57)32 and President 
Ronald Reagan submitted several voucher bills to Congress in 
the mid-1980s, the idea failed to attract broad-based support. 
Instead, vouchers "increasingly became identified with conserva-
tive politics and the Christian coalition" and, worse, with the 
31. See Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement 
162 (Harcourt Brace Sovanovich, 1980); Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 86-87 
(U. of Chicago Press, 1962). 
32. See generally, e.g., Jencks, Education Vouchers (cited in note 14); Coons and 
Sugarman, Family Choice in Education (cited in note 14); Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, 
Private Wealth and Public Education (cited in note 14). See also John E. Coons and 
Stephen D. Sugarman, Education by Choice: The Case for Family Control (U. of Califor-
nia Press, 1978). 
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"choice academies" that had hamstrung the implementation of 
Brown. (p. 57) 
Educational-choice supporters turned instead-some might 
say they lowered their sights-to magnet schools, private man-
agement of government schools, charter schools, and public-
school-only choice. (pp. 57-79) But, as Viteritti sees it, the prob-
lem with these controlled-choice programs-notwithstanding 
their successes-has been "not enough choice, too much con-
trol." (p. 59)33 Charter schools, for example, are "hot."34 
Thirty-four States enacted charter laws in the last decade, mak-
ing these schools "the most revolutionary idea in education for 
the 1990s." (p. 64)35 The hope is that the competitive incentives 
and diversity promised by comprehensive, Friedman-style school 
choice can be achieved within a more decentralized, but still 
public, system of charter schools.36 And, on the political front, 
one advantage of charter schools is that they appear to enjoy bi-
partisan support. Indeed, "[f]or Democratic politicians aligned 
with teachers unions and other education groups, [the charter-
school movement] represented a convenient compromise on 
choice: no funding for private schools, no church-state entan-
glements, a mechanism for increased accountability." (p. 71) 
Still, the teachers' unions are skeptical enough about decentrali-
zation that many States' charter-school laws reflect accommoda-
tions to union concerns more than whole-hearted acceptance of 
choice. (p. 70) As a result, Viteritti complains, charter schools 
are often undermined by the very re;ulatory burdens they were 
designed to circumvent. (pp. 71-72)3 
33. See Christine H. Rossell, Controlled-Choice Desegregation Plans: Not Enough 
Choice, Too Much Control, 31 Urb. Aff. Rev. 43 (Sept. 1995). 
34. See generally, e.g., Marilyn Brown, Whatever Else They Are, Charter Schools 
Are Hot, Tampa Trib. 6 (Nov. 21, 1999); Charter Schools to Receive Aid; Clinton Lauds 
Idea, Grants $95 Million, Wash. Post A12 (Aug. 29, 1999); June Kronholz, Gore JO-Year, 
$115 Billion Schools Plan Includes Aid for Teachers in Poor Areas, Wall St. J. A16 (Dec. 
17, 1999) ("Mr. Gore also called for tripling the number of charter schools, which arc 
publicly funded schools that aren't part of the regular school-district bureaucracy"), 
35. See Chester E. Finn, et al., What If All Schools Were Schools of Choice?, 
Weekly Standard 26 (June 19, 2000) ("[Charter schools] are looking like a possible alter-
native to the [public-school] system itself, foreshadowing a far different public-education 
system than we now know"). 
36. For an excellent summary of where things stand today with charter schools, sec 
the United States Department of Education's report, The State of Charter Schools 2000: 
Fourth-Year Report (Jan. 2000) (available at <http://www.cd.gov/pubs/chartcr4thycar/> ). 
37. See, e.g., Editorial, Charter Hypocrisy, Wall St. J. A26 (Oct. 20, 1999) ("When it 
comes to actual treatment of the nation's fledgling charter schools, the Clinton Admini-
stration follows another policy: It tortures them"); David A. DcSchryver, Strong Charter 
School Laws: A Necessary Condition for the "Ripple Effect," 11 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 311 
(2000). It would seem to be a mistake to be too dour about the promise of charter 
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"Controlled choice" -like the other post-Brown, govern-
ment-centered efforts-seems doomed to fall short of its poten-
tial. Free choice, Viteritti insists, can do better. As James 
Coleman found in the early 1980s, and as has been re-confirmed 
again and again, private schools-particularly Catholic schools-
by and large work well for disadvantaged inner-city children. 
(pp. 80-116) Coleman found, for example, that even controlling 
for students' family background, private schools produce better 
cognitive outcomes; provide a safer, more disciplined, and more 
racially integrated learning environment; offer more academi-
cally focused courses; and better cultivate self-esteem than do 
public schools. (pp. 80-81 )38 Sociologist Andrew Greeley has 
reached similar conclusions, leading him to tout the benefits of 
the "Catholic school effect." (pp. 82-86)39 As best-selling author 
schools, though. See, e.g., Finn, What If All Schools Were Schools of Choice (cited in 
note 35); Scott Milliman, et al., Do Charter Schools Improve District Schools? Three Ap-
proac/zes to the Question, in Robert Maranto, et al., eds., School Choice in the Real 
World: Lessons from Arizona Charter Schools (Western Press, 1999). 
38. James S. Coleman, et al., High School Achievement: Public, Catholic and Pri-
vate Schools Compared (Basic Books, 1982). To be sure, as Viteritti recounts, Coleman's 
methodology and findings were, and continue to be, vigorously disputed. (p. 81-82) See, 
e.g., Jeff Neurauter, On Educational Vouchers: Revisiting the Assumptions, Legal Issues, 
and Policy Perspectives, 17 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 459, 462-469 (1996) (collecting 
and summarizing work of Coleman's critics). That said, Coleman confirmed his findings 
five years later in a study whose methodology was designed to respond to his critics. See 
James S. Coleman and Thomas Hoffer, Public, Catholic and Private Schools: The Impor-
tance of Community (Basic Books, 1987); see also Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republi-
canism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 131, 183 (1995) ("A review of the 
literature, however, suggests that the dispute [between Coleman and his critics] is less 
substantive than the participants make it out to be"); Thomas B. Hoffer, Catholic School 
Attendance and Student Achievement: A Review and Extension of Research, in James 
Youniss and John J. Convey, eds., Catholic Schools at the Crossroads: Survival and 
Transformation (Teachers College Press, 2000). 
39. Andrew Greeley, Catholic High Schools and Minority Students (Transaction 
Books, 1982). See also Anthony S. Bryk, et al., Catholic Schools and the Common Good 
(Harvard U. Press, 1993); Youniss and Convey, Catholic Schools at the Crossroads (cited 
in note 38). For a very different and provocative take on Catholic schools, see generally 
James G. Dwyer, Religious Schools v. Children's Rights (Cornell U. Press, 1998). Al-
though Professor Dwyer's arguments against parents' rights and his defense of children's 
welfare as he sees it are powerful, his tendentious portrait of Catholic schools, and his 
claim that these schools-and, evidently, Catholicism generally-are often harmful to 
children is fatally undermined by his reliance on highly polemical accounts of Catholic 
education. See also Stephen L. Carter, Parents, Religion, and Schools: Reflections on 
Pierce 70 Years Later, 27 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1194, 1209 (1997) ("[S]uch arguments as 
these rest on questionable empirical propositions about what values children learn, and 
where, supported principally by anti-religious stereotypes rather than by any hard analy-
sis of how religions operate"). For a detailed critique of Dwyer's book, see Stephen G. 
Gilles, Hey, Christians! Leave Your Kids Alone!, 16 Const. Comm. 149 (1999). 
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and "lapsed Presbyterian" Tom Wolfe put it, "I'm not Catholic, 
but I have eyes. "40 
The success of Catholic schools might seem reason enough 
to experiment with inclusive school-choice programs,41 but the 
"paradoxical politics of choice" are not so simple. (pp. 86-92) 
Viteritti captures this paradox well, describing the defeat of con-
gressional Republicans' attempt to enact school choice in (or, 
impose choice on) the District of Columbia (p. 90): 
The bill died, but not before treating the nation to a political 
spectacle that dramatized the paradox and irony behind the 
choice debate. A Republican House majority had drafted a 
law that was more consistent with the redistributive politics of 
liberal sociologist Christopher Jencks than with the market 
model of conservative economist Milton Friedman. It was de-
feated by a Democratic majority in the Senate at the behest of 
a Democratic president who had just enjoyed a resounding re-
election victory with strong support from black voters. Clin-
ton epitomized one of the great dilemmas of liberal Democ-
ratic politics: on the one hand, sympathetic to the plight of the 
disadvantaged, concerned with the tragic condition of public 
education in cities; on the other hand, deeply indebted to the 
education establishment and the powerful teachers unions. 
Still, despite the stalemate in Washington, D.C., inclusive school-
choice programs are underway in Milwaukee (pp. 98-108)42 and 
40. John Burger, Tom Wolfe: Catholic Schools Are The Right Stuff, Nat') Cath. Reg. 
3 (Mar. 19-25, 2000). Indeed, voucher opponents appear to agree-at least for litigation 
purposes-that religious schools out-perform public schools. After all, as Viteritti has 
observed, one constitutional argument against choice is that it "provides parents with a 
compelling incentive to attend religious schools." The premise of this argument, of 
course, is that "parochial schools are so academically superior to public schools that 
when given a choice to send their children to religious institutions, parents find the offer 
irresistible." Joseph P. Viteritti, School Choice and American Constitutionalism, Paper 
Presented at the Conference, "Charter Schools, Vouchers, and Public Education," Pro-
gram on Education Policy and Governance, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University (Mar. 10, 2000) (on file with author); see also Simmons-Harris v. 
Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 959 (6th Cir. 2000) ("This program provides incentives for parents 
to choose schools other than mainstream public ones ... ") 
41. Although Coleman's study focused on Catholic and non-Catholic private 
schools, Choosing Equality has little to say about-nor am I aware of research detail-
ing-the performance of inner-city and low-income students in non-religious and non-
Catholic private schools. So, it is not clear how much force the "Catholic school effect" 
argument for school choice should have in areas with no or few Catholic schools. Be-
cause a government-sponsored school-choice program could not, of course, limit private-
school participation to Catholic schools, one might reasonably insist that more study of 
the non-Catholic private schools likely to participate in choice programs is needed. 
42. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the Milwaukee program-which includes 
religious schools-in Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 
997 (1998). 
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Cleveland; (pp. 108-113)43 a sweeping state-wide program was 
enacted in Florida;44 and these efforts have been complemented 
by an array of private initiatives sponsored by religious groups, 
business organizations, and philanthropists. (pp. 92-98)45 
Viteritti concedes that the jury is out on whether pilot 
school-choice programs can produce consistently the kind of 
marked improvements in participating students' performances 
that the "Catholic school effect" would suggest are possible. 
(pp. 113-16) But given what we know about the troubles facing 
urban public schools, the success of Catholic schools, the early 
indicators from the choice programs that have been permitted to 
inch forward,46 and the apparent wishes of poor parents, there 
are, in Viteritti's view, no good reasons not to press ahead. 
True, we do not yet know how well school choice will work. 
Still, Viteritti has insisted, "the most compelling argument for 
choice remains a plea for fairness. We don't need numbers to 
prove that. "47 
43. The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the Cleveland program did not violate 
the Establishment Clause, although it did violate a technical provision of the Ohio Con-
stitution. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999). The program was 
quickly re-enacted, and its opponents just as quickly convinced a federal judge that it did 
violate the Establishment Clause after all. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834 
(N.D. Ohio 1999). Just as this Essay was going to press, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Sim-
mons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000). 
44. See generally, e.g., Florida Begins Voucher Plan for Education, N.Y. Times 
(Abstracts) 15 (Aug. 17, 1999). Florida Governor Jeb Bush signed the new religious 
school voucher program in law on June 21, 1999. A legal challenge to the program is 
pending. See Holmes v. Bush, No. CV 99-3370, 2000 WL 526364 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Mar. 14, 
2000) (invalidating program on state-law grounds); see also Jodi Wilgoren, School 
Vouchers Are Ruled Unconstitutional in Florida, N.Y. Times A20 (Mar. 15, 2000). 
45. For a detailed, current account of school-choice developments across the Na-
tion, see Nina Shokraii Rees, School Choice: What's Happening in the States 2000 (The 
Heritage Foundation). This publication is updated regularly at <http://www.heritage. 
org>. 
46. For more on the effectiveness of school-choice programs, see generally, e.g., 
Peterson, 6 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. (cited in note 22); Paul E. Peterson, et al., The Effec-
tiveness of School Choice in Milwaukee: A Secondary Analysis of Data from the Pro-
gram's Evaluation (1996); Cecilia Elena Rouse, Private School Vouchers and Student 
Achievement: An Evaluation of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program 4 (Dec. 1996). 
For a more mixed-but still generally positive-review of the Milwaukee program, see 
John F. Witte, Jr., The Market Approach to Education: An Analysis of America's First 
Voucher Program (Princeton U. Press, 2000). Witte recently concluded that school 
choice is a "useful tool to aid low-income families." Joe Williams, Ex-Milwaukee Evalua-
tor Endorses School Choice, Milw. J. & Sent. 1 (Jan. 9, 2000). But see, e.g., Bruce Fuller, 
et al., School Choice: Abundant Hopes, Scarce Evidence of Results 84 (Policy Analysis for 
California Education, 1999) ("The scarcity of sound evidence on ... choice is troubling"). 
47. Joseph P. Viteritti, School Choice: Beyond the Numbers, Educ. Week 38 (Feb. 
23,2000). 
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Maybe not. But still, even if reforms in education are 
needed, and even if school choice could work, and is fair-are 
vouchers constitutional? More generally, is there a danger, as 
some charge, that school choice will "take from the pluribus to 
destroy the unum"?48 Is it true that "public, not private, school-
ing is ... the primary means by which citizens can morally edu-
cate future citizens"?49 Is "[pJublic education [really] one of our 
most cherished institutions" 0 and, if so, does school choice 
threaten that institution? In the end, is school choice good pol-
icy for a diverse, liberal, and secular society? 
III 
"Opponents of school choice continue to argue that, not-
withstanding its merits as a vehicle for fulfilling the promise of 
educational equality articulated in Brown, the expenditure of 
public funds for students to attend reli~ious schools violates fed-
eral ... constitutional law." (p. 116) 1 Viteritti insists that it 
doesn't. (pp. 117-44)52 He agrees with those who say that exces-
48. Michael Kelly, Dangerous Minds, New Republic 6 (Dec. 30, 1996). 
49. Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education 10 (Princeton U. Press, 1987). 
50. Minersville Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 598 (1940), overruled, West Va. 
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). It's safe to say that Justice Frank-
furter's conclusion in Gobitis that West Virginia could force Jehovah's Witnesses to sa-
lute the school flag would not likely prove as popular today with public-school champi-
ons as docs his common-school rhetoric. 
51. I assume that Professor Viteritti means to say, "notwithstanding the arguments 
that school choice could be an effective vehicle .... " I am not aware of school-choice 
opponents, or of First Amendment strict-scparationists, who concede that school choice 
would realize Brown's promise. 
52. To barely scratch the surface of the debate, see, e.g., Steffen N. Johnson, A Civil 
Libertarian Case for the Constitutionality of School Choice, 10 Geo. Mason Univ. Civ. R. 
L.J. 1 (1999/2000); Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13 Notre 
Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 341 (1999); Martha Minow, Choice or Commonality: Wel-
fare and Schooling After the End of Welfare as We Knew It, 49 Duke L.J. 493 (1999); Ira 
C. Lupu, The Increasingly Anachronistic Case Against School Vouchers, 13 Notre Dame 
J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 375 (1999); Abner S. Greene, Why Vouchers Are Unconstitu-
tional, and Why They're Not, 13 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 397 (1999). 
The upshot of this scholarship seems to be an emerging consensus that "the Court 
would uphold an educational voucher scheme that would permit parents to decide which 
schools, public or private, their children should attend." Laurence H. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law § 14-10, at 1223 (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1988). The Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Mitchell v. Helms-both Justice Thomas's plurality opinion 
and Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion-will likely shore up this consensus. Sec, 
e.g., 530 U.S. 793, 2000 WL 826256, at *25 (2000) (plurality opinion) ("Chapter 2 docs 
not result in governmental indoctrination, because it determines eligibility for aid neu-
trally, allocates that aid based on the private choices of the parents of schoolchildren, and 
does not provide aid that has an impermissible content"); id. at *31 ("[W]hcn govern-
ment aid supports a school's religious mission only because of independent decisions 
made by numerous individuals to guide their secular aid to that school, no reasonable 
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sive devotion to the "wall of separation" metaphor has resulted 
in a skewed understanding of the First Amendment. He argues 
that the egalitarian pluralism embraced by James Madison, (pp. 
121-26)53 considered in light of the Framers' own religious views, 
(pp. 126-29)54 provides a solid foundation for a coherent, non-
discriminatory Establishment Clause jurisprudence. (pp. 135-
43)55 Viteritti concludes that "[t]he Rehnquist Court has prom-
ulgated a set of legal principles that makes it possible for the 
government to provide tuition assistance to parents of children 
who attend religious schools so long as such aid is administered 
in a neutral fashion and students attend such schools as a matter 
of parental choice." (p. 143)56 
But here's the more difficult question: even if legislators 
may, consistent with the First Amendment, include religious 
schools in school-choice programs, does it follow that they must? 
Viteritti reports, without elaboration,57 that "any government ac-
tion that specifically excludes religious institutions from partici-
pation in a publicly sponsored choice program open to nonreli-
observer is likely to draw ... an inference that the State itself is endorsing a religious 
practice or belieP') (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
53. On James Madison's views concerning religious freedom, see generally John 
Noonan, The Lustre of Our Country: The American Experience of Religious Freedom (U 
of California Press, 1998). 
54. See, e.g., Volokh, 13 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y at 351 (cited in note 
52) ("[M]y sense of the Framers' worldview is that they did not think the government 
was required to discriminate against religion"). 
55. Just such a jurisprudence is developing. See, e.g., Jackson v. Benson, 578 
N.W.2d 602, 613 (1998) ("Although the lines with which the Court has sketched the 
broad contours of this inquiry [into a statute's effects] are fine and not absolutely 
straight, the Court's decisions generally can be distilled to establish an underlying theory 
based on neutrality and indirection"), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998); Kotterman v. 
Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 614-15 (1999) (following Jackson and upholding Arizona's $500 tax 
credit for donations to "school tuition organizations"), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 921 (1999); 
Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 209-10 (Ohio 1999) (relying on neutrality of 
program criteria and role of independent parental choice in holding that program does 
not violate the Establishment Clause). But see Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 
2d 834, 864-65 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (invalidating Cleveland program because "it cannot be 
said that aid only flows to religious institutions as a result of the independent and private 
choices of recipients"), afPd, Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000). 
56. Again, the Court's recent decision in Mitchell seems to confirm Viteritti's analy-
sis, although Justice O'Connor was careful in her concurring (and controlling) opinion to 
insist that the "neutrality" of government aid-while an "important" factor to consider-
might not be sufficient, in every case, to overcome an Establishment Clause challenge. 
Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793, 2000 WL 826256, at *28 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
57. Viteritti notes later that several recent state supreme court decisions "leave un-
resolved" the question "whether a state can discriminate against parochial schools in a 
publicly supported program open to other private schools" and predicts that "the Court 
will ... strike down laws that specifically exclude religious schools or their students from 
benefits provided on a universal basis." (p. 179) 
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gious private schools is likely to raise questions of discrimination 
before the Court." (p. 143) I think he's right, but it's worth ex-
plaining why. 
The theme that "government may not use religion as a basis 
for classification for the imposition of duties, penalties, privileges 
or benefits"58 pervades constitutional law. More and more, it is 
urged that various constitutional provisions work together, com-
plementing each other, to guarantee religious liberty by forbid-
ding discrimination-that is, by requiring "equality"-in matters 
of religion. Viteritti's chapter on school choice and the First 
Amendment is titled "Equality as Religious Freedom;" perhaps 
it could have been called, "Religious Freedom Through Equal-
ity." In any event, the upshot of this emerging synergetic view is 
that excluding religious schools from otherwise general and neu-
tral education-benefits programs presumptively violates the Free 
Speech, Establishment, and Free Exercise Clauses of the First 
Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal 
Protection Clause.59 
First, the Establishment Clause itself protects individuals' 
ability to exercise freely, or refrain from exercising, their religion 
by mandating that government not use its power to skew the de-
cision for (or against) religious faith and practice.60 That is, the 
government may not "establish" religion, not because religion is 
suspect or to be feared-quite the contrary-but because it is a 
good thing for people to exercise religion freely. 61 And so, just 
58. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
59. I can provide only an outline of these arguments. For more detailed scholarly 
discussions, see, e.g., Volokh, 13 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y at 365-73 (cited in 
note 52); see also, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to 
the Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on 'Equal Access' for Religious 
Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 653, 675-700 (1996); Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Es• 
tablishment Clause Litigation, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 311, 326-50 (1986). And in the 
courts, compare, e.g., Peter v. Wedi, 155 F.3d 992, 996-97 (8th Cir. 1998) ("Government 
discrimination based on religion violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment .... the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment .... and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"), with KDM v. Reedsport Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 
1046 (9th Cir. 1999) (Oregon regulation which denied educational services available to 
private-school students to student in a religious school did not violate First or Fourteenth 
Amendments). 
60. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 
{1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (government 
may not make "adherence to a religion relevant ... to a person's standing in the political 
community"). 
61. Put slightly differently, we protect religious liberty through the Religion Clauses 
because religion is a positive good, and worth protecting. Sec John Garvey, What Are 
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as surely as the Establishment Clause prohibits government con-
duct that promotes, advances, or endorses religion, it guards with 
equal vigor against any government discrimination toward, or 
official disapproval of, faith. The state may neither advance nor 
inhibit reliW:ion;62 it should neither favor nor display hostility to-
ward faith; 3 it may not endorse or disapprove religion.64 
Second, the Free Exercise Clause affirmatively prohibits 
governments from "impos[ing] special disabilities on the basis of 
religious views or religious status."65 That is, the state may not 
"discriminate[] against some or all religious beliefs or regulate[] 
or prohibit[] conduct because it is undertaken for religious rea-
sons."66 It is no less discriminatory, the argument goes, to deny 
otherwise-generally-available benefits-school vouchers, for in-
stance-on the basis of religion than to single out religious con-
duct for prohibition or disfavor. The Free Exercise Clause 
would not permit government to say, "every retiree gets $30,000 
per year, unless they plan on spending any of that money on Bi-
bles," nor should it permit government to say, "education is so 
important to our community that every child is entitled to a pub-
licly funded education at the public or private school of his or 
her parents' choice, unless the parents select a religious private 
school. "67 
Freedoms For? (Harvard U. Press, 1996); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, God Is Great, 
Gan•ey ls Good: Making Sense of Religious Freedom, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1597, 1597 
(1997) ("Garvey's claim is that we protect religious freedom for the sake of religion .... 
[He] argues that the religion clauses reflect a religious premise, exist for the sake of pro-
tecting religion, and ought to be read in that light"). This claim-which strikes me as a 
powerful one-would seem to call into question the Court's newfound habit in First 
Amendment cases of treating and protecting faith as just another form of expression, and 
religion as just another "viewpoint" to be tolerated. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rectors and 
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
62. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,218 (1997). 
63. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,443 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
64. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,585 (1987). As Professor Volokh 
observes, statements like these-implying a positive Establishment Clause "evenhand-
edness" requirement-"have largely been dicta." Volokh, 13 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & 
Pub. Pol'y at 369 (cited in note 52). One reason why it might be difficult to frame a case 
where government conduct was hostile to or inhibited religion in violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause is that any such conduct would most likely be analyzed under the Free 
Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 
U.S. 520 (1993). 
65. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). 
66. Church of the Lukumi BabaluAye, Inc. 508 U.S. at 532. 
67. See Hartmann v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973, 977-79 (6th Cir. 1995) (excluding religious 
day-care centers from general program that permits child-care providers to use govern-
ment housing on military bases is discrimination that violates the Free Exercise Clause). 
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Third, the Free Speech Clause is now understood to pro-
hibit the government from discriminating against religious 
speech or expression.68 How might a school-choice program im-
plicate the Free Speech Clause? There are (at least) two possi-
bilities. For starters, when schools express ideas and values to 
students and to the world through their curricula, programs, and 
teachers, they engage in core First Amendment "speech. "69 
What's more, parents' decisions about where and how to educate 
their children, and about the messages, information, and values 
that will be imparted to their children, are for many parents 
among the most important "expressions" of their lives. Indeed, 
for many low-income parents (and for their children), educa-
tional choices may be one of the few available vehicles for ex-
pressing their beliefs-and, in a sense, for publicizing, through 
their educational choices, those beliefs-about matters of ulti-
mate concern.70 In other words, the Free Speech argument for 
non-discriminatory choice programs has two parts: the govern-
ment may not discriminate against schools based on the religious 
content of their "speech," i.e., their curricular programs; nor may 
it discriminate against the religiously motivated educational de-
cisions-again, the "expression" -of parents and students. 
Finally, discrimination on the basis of religion violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 71 That 
68. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 
(1995) (state university that funded student activities generally could not single out reli-
gious newspaper for denial of funds); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free 
School Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (following Widmar in elementary-school context); 
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (if college opens classrooms to secular meetings it 
must open them to religious meetings). See generally Paulsen, 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 
653-62 (cited in note 59) (summarizing and analyzing the Widmar line of cases). 
69. See generally Johnson, 10 Geo. Mason Univ. Civ. R. L.J. at 31-36 (cited in note 
52). Cf. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277,289 (2000) ("[N]ude dancing of the type 
at issue here is expressive conduct, although we think that it falls only within the outer 
ambit of the First Amendment's protection"). 
70. See generally Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Mani-
festo, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 937, 1012-33 (1996) (arguing that "parents have a free-speech 
right to communicate their values to their children both directly and through the speech 
of teachers and schools"). Some have argued, though, that this line of argument and the 
instrumental view of children upon which it is thought to rest arc profoundly illiberal, 
and even offensive, at least to the extent that parents' interests in communicating values 
to their children are allowed to trump the children's own temporal interests (as deter-
mined by third parties). See, e.g., Dwyer, Religious Schools v. Children's Rights at 90-96 
(cited in note 39). But sec Gilles, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 951-60, supra, (arguing that a 
"parcntalist" allocation of rights is in children's best interests). 
71. See, e.g., Peter v. Wedi, 155 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1998) ("Government dis-
crimination based on religion violates the ... Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment"); cf. Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dept., 728 A.2d 127, 137 (Mc. 1999) (exclu-
sion of religious schools from tuitioning program would be unconstitutional under the 
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Clause requires that "certain traits, including religion and ... re-
ligiosity, should not be bases for governmental classifications."72 
Once government elects to provide a public-welfare benefit-
education -it may not single out religious people and religious 
institutions for a shoddier version of that benefit, any more than 
it could decide to reduce the Fire Department's budget by telling 
it not to bother with "house calls" to churches.73 
These four provisions, working together, provide the basis 
for a formidable argument that the exclusion of religious schools 
from otherwise-generally-available school-choice programs-
that is, from programs that are open to non-religious private 
schools-is unconstitutional discrimination against religion and 
religious expression. Under this approach, such exclusion is not 
simply a "refusal to subsidize" religion.74 It is, instead, a decision 
to specially disadvantage religion in the context of a decision to 
fund education-public and private-generally.75 Of course, the 
States are not required-at least, not until the Court is con-
vinced by Professor Viteritti that Brown's _gromise requires oth-
erwise!-to enact school-choice programs. But if they do, they 
can no more single out religious choices, persons, or institutions 
for special disadvantage in the context of those programs than 
they could prevent otherwise-eligible Mass-going Catholics from 
running for office.77 
Equal Protection Clause were it not justified by the government's "compelling" interest 
in complying with the Establishment Clause"), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 947 (1999); Strout v. 
Albanese, 178 F.3d 57, 64 (1st Cir. 1999) (rejecting equal-protection challenge to exclu-
sion of religious schools from tuitioning program schools because "the state's compelling 
interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation requires that the statute exclude 
sectarian schools from the tuition program"), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 931 (1999). See gen-
erally, Paulsen, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 356-59 (cited in note 59) (applying "Equal Pro-
tection Model" to school vouchers). 
72. Volokh, 13 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y at 371 (cited in note 52). 
73. Id. at 370-71 & n.60. 
74. Cf. Strout, 178 F.3d at 60; Bagley, 728 A.2d at 135. 
75. See, e.g., Wedi, 155 F.3d at 1001-02; KDM, 196 F.3d at 1053 (Kleinfeld, J., dis-
senting) ("Handicapped children at secular private schools get special education in their 
schools, but handicapped children at religious private schools must leave school to get 
the same special education. This law violates the Constitution because it distinguishes 
between people and burdens some of them on account of their religious practices"). 
76. Topeka, Kansas was not required, in 1954, to operate public schools. But once 
it had chosen to operate such schools, it was not permitted to discriminate on the basis of 
race in their operation. As the Court observed in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,597 
(1972), "(we have] made clear that even though a person has no 'right' to a valuable gov-
ernment benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the gov-
ernment may not rely" (emphasis added). 
77. Cf. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (invaliding on free-exercise grounds a 
Tennessee constitutional provision barring "ministers of the Gospel or priests of any de-
nomination whatever" from serving as delegates to a constitutional convention). 
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IV 
Viteritti contends-persuasively, in my view-that the fed-
eral Constitution permits States to experiment with religion-
neutral school-choice programs. However, Viteritti warns, 
"[M]any states have provisions within their constitutions that set 
strict separationist standards and prohibit direct or indirect aid 
to religious institutions." (p. 144) These provisions-many of 
which were inserted into States' constitutions specifically to pre-
vent students from using public money to attend Catholic 
schools-probably pose more significant barriers to choice-based 
reform than does the First Amendment. (pp. 168-79) 
Viteritti's discussion of these state laws, of the nativist fears 
that often inspired them, and of the Blaine Amendment that was 
in many cases their model, is perhaps Choosing Equality's most 
important contribution. (pp. 145-68) It is important because 
many who today oppose school choice invoke the claimed 
achievements and ideals of our common-school tradition, con-
tending-at least implicitly-that the homogenization and mo-
nopolization by government of American education should be 
credited with building our modern, diverse, liberal, and literate 
society.78 But one need not deny the successes, and even the 
strengths, of American public education to recognize that the 
common-school movement and its later Progressive re-
incarnations were in large part animated-even in respectable 
circles-by the anti-Catholicism that historian Arthur 
Schlesinger, Sr., once called the "the deepest bias in the history 
of the American people."79 
Viteritti sets out the often overlooked (in courts and law 
schools, anyway) story of how Horace Mann and his followers 
used the common schools to impose on Catholic immigrants and 
78. See, e.g., Ted Forstmann, Break Up the Education Monopoly. Wall St. J. A26 
(Sept. 9, 1999) ("The U.S., we are led to believe, was founded upon a system of govern-
ment-provided education; tinker with it, and you tinker with the underpinnings of our 
democracy. In reality, government-delivered education-a.k.a. 'public education'-
wasn't established until roughly a century after our country's founding. The system it 
replaced-the system of education our country was founded upon-was characterized 
above all by diversity, competition, and choice"). See generally Andrew J. Coulson, 
Market Education: The Unknown History (Transaction Publishers, 1999). 
79. John Tracy Ellis, American Catholicism 151 (2d ed. 1969); see also Peter Stein-
fels, Of Bob Jones U., American Culture, and Anti-Catholicism, N.Y. Times B17 (Mar, 4, 
2000) ("[O]pposing anti-Catholicism in the United States by denouncing Bob Jones is 
about as relevant to today's reality as combating medical errors by condemning leeches 
and snake oil. The Catholic Church takes more nasty hits weekly on cable television 
than yearly from Bob Jones"). 
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other religious minorities the "non-sectarian"80 values of the "de 
facto Protestant Establishment";81 how fears about immigration, 
the overwrought rantin§s of nativist ministers, and goofy para-
noia about "nunneries" 2 contributed to the rise of the Know 
Nothings;83 how the political calculations of James G. Blaine and 
President Grant nearly resulted in a constitutional amendment 
aimed at fixing the "defect"-namely, the lack of a clear prohibi-
tion on aid to religious schools-in the United States Constitu-
tion;84 and how, notwithstanding Blaine's failure, by 1890, 
twenty-nine States had "baby Blaine" amendments in their con-
stitutions. 85 Another anti-aid wave, and then the pragmatic secu-
larism of Mann's descendant, John Dewey, (pp. 157-61) swept 
through the statute books in the early twentieth century. (pp. 
80. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 2000 WL 826256, at *24 (2000) (plurality 
op.) ("[I]t was an open secret that 'sectarian' was code for Catholic"). See generally, e.g., 
Richard A. Baer, The Supreme Court's Discriminatory Use of the Term 'Sectarian,' 6 J. L. 
& Pol. 449 (1990); Carter, 27 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 1199 (cited in note 39) ("The common 
school, which was sold to the public on expressly religious grounds, simply cannot be un-
derstood except as an effort to Protestantize the immigrant children"). But see Stephen 
Macedo, Diversity and Distrust 88 (Harvard U. Press, 2000) ("It is too simple to say that 
the early common schools were in the business of 'Protestantizing' Catholic immi-
grants . . . . To a significant degree, the common schools represented a shared civic vi-
sion. Convergence on that vision could not ... be taken for granted"). 
81. Mark De Wolfe Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness 31 (U. of Chicago Press, 
1965). 
82. Lloyd P. Jorgenson, The State and the Non-Public School 1825-1925 at 88 (U. of 
Missouri Press, 1987) (describing Massachusetts' "Nunnery Investigation Committee"); 
see also Maria Monk, The Awful Disclosures of Maria Monk, as Exhibited in a Narrative 
of Her Sufferings During a Residence of Five Years as a Novice and Two Years as a Black 
Nun, in the Hotel Dieu Nunnery in Montreal (Maria Monk, 1836). 
83. Abraham Lincoln once observed of the Know Nothings that "[w]hen the Know-
Nothings get control, [the Declaration of Independence] will read 'all men are created 
equal except Negroes and foreigners and Catholics."' Letter from Abraham Lincoln to 
Joshua Speed (Aug. 24, 1855), reprinted in R. Basler, ed., 2 The Collected Works of 
Abraham Lincoln 320,323 (Rutgers U. Press, 1953). 
84. The amendment's sponsor, Representative James G. Blaine of Maine, "fully 
understood the wide political appeal of the nativist and anti-Catholic rhetoric that ac-
companied [President U.S. Grant's] agenda and intended to take full advantage of it." 
(p. 152) Viteritti writes that Blaine's "name would live in perpetuity as a symbol of the 
irony and hypocrisy that characterized much future debate over aid to religious schools: 
employing constitutional language, invoking patriotic images, appealing to claims of indi-
vidual rights. All these ploys would serve to disguise the real business that was at hand: 
undermining the viability of schools run by religious minorities to prop up and perpetu-
ate a publicly supported monopoly of government-run schools." (p. 153) 
85. Arizona's Supreme Court noted recently that "[t]he Blaine Amendment was a 
clear manifestation of religious bigotry, part of a crusade manufactured by the contem-
porary Protestant establishment to counter what was perceived as a growing Catholic 
menace." Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 624 (Ariz. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 921 
(1999); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 2000 WL 826256, *24 (2000) (plurality 
op.) ("Consideration of the [Blaine Amendment] arose at a time of pervasive hostility to 
the Catholic Church and to Catholics in general"). 
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154-55)86 Viteritti concludes that, rather than a model for com-
munity-building education in a diverse society, "the history of 
the common school movement is a telling story of the risks in-
volved when a political majority is allowed to establish a mo-
nopoly over education and impose its values on other people's 
children." (p. 150) In fact, Viteritti observes, "there is no epi-
sode in the American chronicle that better illustrates the inher-
ent dangers of majority rule that so preoccupied Madison than 
the history of the common school." (p. 145)87 
The point of this history is that the federal constitutional is-
sues surrounding school choice are like "level one" of the typical 
Nintendo or Sega video game: Super Mario, for example, avoids 
calamity after calamity only to face still other, even more formi-
dable challenges-here, the congealed nativism still entrenched 
in many States' constitutions. 88 And so, Viteritti is concerned 
that "the relief that advocates of school choice can expect to de-
rive from the High Court will prove to be circumscribed and un-
satisfying. . . . For this reason, the monopoly that government-
operated institutions enjoy over public funding remains secure." 
(p.179) 
I'm not so sure. First, if the argument outlined above is cor-
rect-i.e., if the Constitution not only permits the inclusion of re-
ligious schools in school-choice programs but also forbids their 
discriminatory exclusion-then this federal equal-treatment 
mandate cannot be trumped by state constitutional provisions 
that purport to require discrimination. As Justice Brennan once 
emphasized, the States are free through their own constitutions 
to provide greater protection to individuals from government 
than does the Bill of Rights. 89 But while it is fairly easy to see 
86. Viteritti sees some liberal theorists-Bruce Ackerman, Amy Gutmann, Stephen 
Macedo, and others-as continuing in this mold (pp. 164-68). Sec, e.g., Gutmann, De-
mocratic Education at 21 ( cited in note 49) ( education must "convert children away from 
the intensely held beliefs of their parents"). 
87. See generally Charles Leslie Glenn, Jr., The Myth of the Common School (U. of 
Massachusetts Press, 1988); Jorgenson, The State and the Non-Public School (cited in 
note 82); Diane Ravitch, The Great School Wars (Basic Books, 1974); John T. McGrccvy, 
Thinking on One's Own: Catholicism in the American Intellectual Imagination, 1928-1960, 
84 J. Am. Hist. 97 {1997). 
88. See generally, Toby J. Heytens, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 Va. L. 
Rev. 117 (2000). This is not to say that the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause case-
law gets a "pass" on anti-Catholicism. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 2000 WL 
826256, at **23-24 (2000) (plurality opinion). See generally Lupu, 13 Notre Dame J.L. 
Ethics & Pub. Pol'y at 385 (cited in note 52 {describing place of anti-Catholicism and 
negative stereotypes about Catholic education in the development of modern Establish-
ment Clause doctrine). 
89. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
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how this "floor, not ceiling" idea plays out in the context of, say, 
a search-and-seizure case, it is not so obvious that the States may 
provide extra "protection" from "establishments" of religion if, 
in so doing, they purport to forbid the equal treatment of relig-
ion that the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause 
require. That is, no State's anti-aid provision or "baby Blaine" 
amendment can license, let alone demand, what the United 
States Constitution forbids.90 
Second, there is ample evidence that many States' anti-aid 
provisions were motivated by bigotry-by discriminatory "ani-
mus"91-to support an argument that these laws violate the 
Equal Protection Clause, as well as the various clauses of the 
First Amendment. Several parents are claiming as much in 
Boyette v. Galvin,92 a case challenging Massachusetts' 1854 
"Anti-Aid" Amendment (a precursor to the Blaine Amend-
ment(s)).93 The "legislative history" and anti-Catholic purpose 
of the Massachusetts Amendment-and of the additional 
amendment that purported to prevent the Anti-Aid Amendment 
from ever being changed by ballot initiative-are well estab-
lished. (pp. 148-51)94 The Boyette plaintiffs believe that these 
Massachusetts provisions "unfairly shut out people with religious 
interests from the electoral process by barring a citizen ballot ini-
tiative on the aid issue, while allowing other groups to use ballot 
initiatives to change state laws."95 
Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977). 
90. See U.S. Const., Art. VI ("This Constitution ... shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Consti-
tution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding"); see also, e.g., McDaniel v. 
Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (fact that unconstitutional discrimination against clergy was author-
ized by state statute did not save the statute); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (re-
jecting argument that compliance with the State of Missouri's arguably more restrictive 
Establishment Clause-type provisions justified discrimination against student groups and 
speakers on the basis of their religious speech and activity); cf. Chittenden Town School 
Dist. v. Department. of Educ., 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999) (holding that Vermont Constitu-
tion required the exclusion of religious schools from tuitioning program and that the 
United States Constitution was not violated by such exclusion), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 
1066 (1"999). 
91. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see also Jeremy Rabkin, Partisan in the 
Culture Wars, 30 McGeorge L. Rev. 105, 109 (1998) ("What is the difference between a 
state Blaine amendment and the Colorado amendment rejected in Romer?"). 
92. No. 98-CV-10377 (D. Mass. filed Mar. 3, 1998) (Complaint available at 
<http://www.becketfund.org> ). 
93. See Editorial, Erasing Historic Error, Bos. Herald 12 (Mar. 7, 1998). For more 
on the Massachusetts provisions in question, see Jorgenson, The State and the Non-Public 
School, at 159-86 (cited in note 82). 
94. See generally, Complaint, Boyette v. Galvin, supra note 92, at 'l['l[ 7-23. 
95. Diego Ribadeneira, School Aid Suit Cites a History of Bias, Bos. Globe Bl 
(Nov. 12, 1998); Complaint, Boyette v. Galvin, supra note 92, at 'l[ 2 ("The Anti-Aid 
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Now, it is not clear that either the "federal supremacy" or 
"historical animus" arguments against the States' muscular anti-
aid amendments will succeed. Still, it's hard to see why they 
should not.96 Viteritti's conclusion that, in light of the "baby 
Blaines," "religious liberty in America" is "a limited freedom" in 
the education context might therefore be a bit too pessimistic, or 
at least premature. (p. 179) Perhaps the "promise of Brown" 
will one day trump the legacy of Blaine. 
V 
Choosing Equality closes with a provocative response to the 
"school choice divides, but public schools unite" argument. (pp. 
180-208) As Viteritti observes, most would agree that "a well 
educated citizenry is among the most critical factors for ensuring 
the stability of a democracy." (p. 180) And so, he concedes that 
"[p]ublic education indeed serves as a foundation for American 
democracy as we know it." (p. 181) He insists, though, that the 
radical disengagement of public education from religious values 
and traditions has handicapped it in performing its task of 
"teach[ing] each of us how to live together amicably and produc-
tively in a pluralist society." (Id.) And in response to those con-
cerned that private-school choice, and private schools generally, 
undermine the res publica and threaten the health of participa-
tory democracy,97 Viteritti praises the role that such mediating 
Amendment bars [plaintiffs] from seeking, through the nonnal democratic process, any 
fonn of state aid to assist them in meeting the cost of tuition and other expenses at non-
public schools"). The Boyette plaintiffs also allege violations of the Free Speech, Free 
Exercise, Right to Petition, Establishment, and Equal Protection Clauses. Id., at~~ 35-
51. Cf. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,458 U.S. 457,474 (1982) (holding that a 
school-busing-related initiative violated the Equal Protection Clause because it removed 
"the authority to address a racial problem-and only a racial problem-from the existing 
decisionmaking body in such a way as to burden minority interests"). 
96. One interesting question is the extent to which the anti-Catholic motives behind 
the various States' Blaine-type provisions should control the question whether these pro-
visions are, today, unconstitutional. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) 
("Without deciding whether [Section] 182 would be valid if enacted today without any 
impennissible motivation, we simply observe that its original enactment was motivated 
by a desire to discriminate against blacks on account of race and the section continues to 
this day to have that effect"). These provisions' unsavory purpose should not obscure 
the fact that, whatever their purpose, many of them are facially discriminatory against 
religion, and therefore presumptively violate the Free Exercise Clause. 
97. See, e.g., Minow, 49 Duke L.J. at 495 (cited in note 52) {"Reliance on vouchers 
for schooling and welfare indeed can promote competition, pluralism, and at least the 
appearance of private choice. However, such reliance risks diminishing the sense of 'we,' 
the collective to which everyone in the country should feel connected or responsible"). 
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institutions have played in "advancing the democratic ethos:" 
(p. 183) 
Research shows that adults who have attended parochial 
schools display high levels of patriotism, tolerance, and civic 
involvement .... If designed appropriately, school choice pro-
grams would be particularly beneficial to poor communities, 
not only extending educational opportunities, but also invigo-
rating civic life and addressing the larger problem of political 
inequality that besets economically disadvantaged people. (p 
183)98 
Viteritti's argument that school choice could help to re-
engage Americans with their communities, to counter our perva-
sive cynicism about public institutions, to empower politically 
the currently disenfranchised, and to get us bowling together 
again,99 is a powerful one. (pp. 183-208) But in his enthusiasm 
for demonstrating that religious schools are "safe," and for reas-
suring skeptics that religious institutions do not threaten the 
civic enterprise, he does not, in my view, respond as forcefully as 
he could to the "flip side" problem, that is, to the challenges that 
some liberal views of the civic enterprise pose to religious lib-
erty. Although Viteritti assures us that "[i]t is [our] pluralism-
political, legal, demographic- that will always remain the most 
significant safeguard against the threat of an established 
church," (p. 195) more should be said about the need for "safe-
guards against the threat of [the liberal state]." 
In the first place, as Viteritti recognizes, such safeguards will 
be needed within the context of any school-choice program. Re-
ligious schools do strengthen the fabric of civil society and can 
provide important secular goods, but it is crucial that they not be 
co-opted by or absorbed into the state, and that they not lose 
their ability to stand outside of, to challenge, and-if necessary-
to subvert the state.100 And so, while religious schools that par-
98. Viteritti emphasizes that "(t]here is no discernible evidence that the implemen-
tation of public or private school choice would have a negative influence on civil society 
in America." (p. 207) See generally Peterson, 6 Va. J. Soc. Pol. & Law at 72-73 (cited in 
note 22); Smith and Sikkink, Is Private School Privatizing? (cited in note 22); Greene, 
Civic Values in Public and Private Schools at 95-98 (cited in note 22). 
99. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community (Simon & Schuster, 2000). 
100. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Religious Freedom As If Religion Matters: A Trib-
ute to Justice Brennan, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 1059, 1060 (1999) ("As long as religion avoids the 
temptation to join its authority to the authority of the state, it can indeed play a subver-
sive role, because it focuses the attention of the believer on a source of moral under-
standing that transcends both the authority of positive law and the authority of human 
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ticipate in voucher programs could reasonably be required to ac-
cept some degree of performance-related oversight, these 
schools and their religious missions must be protected from 
overly intrusive, message-garbling government regulations. (pp. 
221-22)101 
There are also other, perhaps more amorphous, threats to 
religious education and to the autonomy of religious schools 
posed by contemporary liberalism that are not countered by 
Viteritti's confident references to "our pluralism." As he puts it, 
"because so few Americans live their lives according to the strict 
dictates of their faith," and therefore "the majority of us do not 
appreciate the strength of the moral obligations that compel de-
vout observers," there is the "danger" of "oppression by the ma-
jority" of "people of conscience." (p. 208) Now, I cannot possi-
bly do justice here to the "Deliberative Democracy, Liberal 
Civic Education, and Religion" debate. Suffice it to say that 
more than a few leading liberal scholars-perhaps following the 
example of some Supreme Court Justices102-appear increas-
ingly wary of traditional religious beliefs and willing to question 
the extent to which a diverse society grounded in a norm of tol-
erance can tolerate the pe~etuation of "intolerant" beliefs 
through religious education. 10 This line of thinking is, of course, 
moral systems"). 
101. See, e.g., Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil Society: School Vouchers, Reli• 
gious Nonprofit Organizations, and Liberal Public Values, 75 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 417,432 
(2000) (" Although there is nothing we can do to altogether allay concerns about a 
voucher system that includes religious schools, there are things that we can do to help 
insure that voucher recipients tend to conform with public purposes. I want to defend 
the strings that will come attached to vouchers, and argue for their significance"). In• 
deed, the threat of intrusive "strings" has lead some to oppose school choice, precisely to 
protect authentic religious education. See Scott W. Somerville, The History and Politics 
of School Choice, 10 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 121 (1999/2000). This is not an idle 
concern. See, e.g., Dwyer, Religious Schools v. Children's Rights at 180 (cited in note 39) 
("That Fundamentalist and Catholic schooling as presently constituted would no longer 
[i.e., after regulation] exist should not ... be cause for mourning, at least not for anyone 
who respects the personhood of children"). For an argument that the Constitution limits 
the extent to which regulatory "strings" may interfere with religious schools' missions, 
see Paulsen, 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 710-17 (cited in note 59). 
102. See, e.g., Board. Of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 
687, 711 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 244-47 (1971) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,635 n.20 (1971) (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
103. See, e.g., Macedo, Diversity and Distrust at 147 (cited in note 80) ("Some reli-
gious beliefs are at odds with liberalism itself. We should tolerate the intolerant ... but 
we need not bend over backwards to make life easy for them"); id. at 152 ("The hard fact 
is that we cannot make everyone happy. Trying to do so can sell short liberal ideals and 
practices that are and will remain partisan and controversial"); Carter, 87 Cal. L. Rev. at 
1082 (cited in note 100) (citing and criticizing arguments against religious education 
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antithetical to Viteritti's view that religious freedom is insepara-
ble from the central liberal value-equality-and that religious 
schools must be key players in the efforts to vindicate that value. 
Given the centrality of religious freedom to Viteritti's argument, 
Choosing Equality could perhaps have benefitted from a more 
muscular defense of religious education against the claims of 
"liberal statism."104 
Two final addenda-and each deserves a more detailed 
treatment than I can provide here- to Viteritti's discussion 
might be useful. First, perhaps because Choosing Equality bends 
over backwards to make the "bleeding heart" case for empower-
ing parents ( or perhaps simply because of its title), the book's 
arguments are couched in "equality" terms-i.e., "poor parents 
should be no less able to make choices for their children than 
rich parents"-rather than "liberty" terms-i.e., "all parents 
have the right to decide, without financial penalty, how to raise 
and educate their children." As a result, when Viteritti sets out 
his policy proposals, he stops short of full school choice. He rec-
ommends, for example, that "[p]articipation in the private (and 
parochial) school choice program should be limited to families 
that can meet a predetermined objective standard of economic 
need" and that those "who would opt out of their regular public 
schools for academic reasons should be given a preference over 
those who would choose another school for philosophical or re-
ligious reasons." (pp. 219-20)1°5 
Putting aside ( quite reasonable) concerns about political 
palatability, it is not clear why such limits are needed or justi-
fied.106 True, limiting school-choice programs to low-income 
made by Gutmann, Macedo, and Suzanna Sherry); Carter, 27 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 1208-
09 (cited in note 39) (same). It is worth emphasizing that, notwithstanding his extremely 
negative view of traditional religious education, James Dwyer does not appear to ground 
his arguments in theories about the needs of liberal civil society, but rather in his view of 
children's temporal best interests. See Dwyer, Religious Schools v. Children's Rights at 
79-101 (cited in note 39). 
104. Stephen G. Gilles, Liberal Parentalism and Children's Educational Rights, 26 
Cap. U. L. Rev. 9, 11 (1997); Carter, 87 Cal. L. Rev. at 1065 (cited in note 100) ("When I 
say statism, I do not simply mean, as the formal definition would suggest, a preference 
for state solutions; I have in mind a sense of the state's rightness, or goodness-an em-
pirical belief that the state is less likely than the individual to make a moral error. Since 
the Enlightenment, the entire liberal political project has rested on this idea"). 
105. I certainly do not mean to suggest that Viteritti denigrates the choices of relig-
iously motivated parents (see p. 220) or that he in any way advocates "watering down" 
the religious identity of religious schools (p. 10) ("[T]hese schools should not be forced to 
compromise the generally pervasive religious climate that makes them what they are"). 
106. But see John E. Coons, School Choice as Simple Justice, First Things 15 (Apr. 
1992) (endorsing proposals similar to Viteritti's). 
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parents, or to children in failing schools, is consistent with the 
idea that school choice is instrumentally valuable in the struggle 
to remedy economic disadvantage and advance Brown's promise 
of equality. But what about another, perhaps even stronger, ar-
gument for school choice, namely, that in a free and pluralistic 
society, decisions about education should be left to parents and 
the role of the government limited for the most part to support-
ing those choices on an equal and nondiscriminatory basis?107 
Viteritti does not seem to disagree with this more liberty-based 
argument for choice, so unless restrictions on the scope of choice 
programs are, in his view, necessary to achieve his social-justice 
ends and equality ideals, perhaps they should be discarded. 
This leads to a second, related, Choosing Equality codicil: In 
my view, the case for school choice is strongest when tied even 
more explicitly than it is in Choosing Equality to the fundamen-
tal right of parents to direct and control the upbringing and edu-
cation of their children. This right was most famously recog-
nized, of course, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 108 Viteritti notes 
that Pierce's language "would echo for generations to come, at 
once affirming the right of parents to control the upbringing of 
their children and the commensurate permissibility of private 
and parochial schools to exist as viable alternatives available to 
parents." (p. 130) Unfortunately, "[a]s important a victory as 
Pierce was for parents, it was only a limited one" (id.), and 
Viteritti later expresses regrets that "the promise of .... 
Pierce" - that is, the promise that parents could "send their chil-
dren to schools that reflect their own values" - "remains a hol-
low promise, conditioned to a large degree by the economic po-
sition of parents." (p.143) 
This is important. More needs to be said about the "prom-
ise of Pierce" and its relevance to the school-choice debate. 109 
But Viteritti's focus is more the long road to the equality prom-
ised in Brown than the near-term threats of statism to Pierce-
style liberty, and so he does not confront squarely the fact that 
the problem with Pierce is not simply that its "promise" is hard 
to realize without money. Rather, it is that the aspect of liberty 
107. For such an argument, see generally, e.g., Gilles, Liberal Parentalism and Chil-
dren's Educational Rights (cited in note 104). 
108. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 {1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390 (1923). The existence of this fundamental right was re-affirmed most recently in 
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) {"The liberty interest at issue in this case ..• is 
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court"). 
109. See generally, e.g., Carter, Parents, Religion, and Schools (cited in note 39). 
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that case recognized has been slowly eroding, as many courts 
have embraced a "poor relation"110 theory of the right and per-
mitted arguable infringements upon it without applying the strict 
scrutiny that incursions upon fundamental freedoms are usually 
thought to deserve. m 
Just recently, in Troxel v. Granville,112 the Supreme Court 
invalidated an application of Washington's "breathtakingly 
broad"113 third-party-visitation law. The law purported to au-
thorize "any person" to petition a court for visitation rights "at 
any time," and it permitted courts to award such rights, over a 
parent's objection, whenever, in the court's view, "visitation 
[would] serve the best interest of the child."114 As Justice 
O'Connor emphasized in her plurality opinion the law "accorded 
no deference" to a parent's decision that third-party visitation 
would not be in the child's best interests: "[S]hould the judge dis-
agree with the parent's estimation of the child's best interests, 
the judge's view necessarily prevails."115 In light of the constitu-
tionally grounded presumption that "natural bonds of affection 
lead parents to act in the best interests of their children" 116-a 
presumption that the Washington scheme ignored117-the Court 
110. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994) ("We see no reason why 
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment ... should be relegated to the status of a 
poor relation"). 
111. See, e.g., Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454,462 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 813 (1996) ("[W]here, as here, parents seek for secular reasons to ex-
empt their child from an educational requirement and the basis is a claimed right to di-
rect the 'upbringing' of their child, rational basis review applies"); Ohio Ass'n of Indep. 
Sch. v. Goff, 92 F.3d 419, 423 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1104 (1997) (stating 
that "rational basis review, not strict scrutiny," governs "wholly secular limitations on 
private school education"); Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. Of Educ., 89 F.3d 
179 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1111 (1997) (concluding that because parents' 
"interest is not religious, ... we must reject their position if the [challenged regulation] 
bear[s] some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes"); Brown v. Hot, Sexy and 
Safer Prod., Inc., 68 F.3d 525,533 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (1996) ("We 
need not decide here whether the right to rear one's children is fundamental"). The 
Court's decision in Troxel should lead to a greater appreciation for the Pierce right in 
lower courts. Still, Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion was noteworthy in its failure to 
identify clearly the required standard of review. See Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2068 (Thomas, 
J. concurring) ("The opinions of the plurality, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter rec-
ognize such a right, but curiously none of them articulates the appropriate standard of 
review. I would apply strict scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights"). 
112. 530 U.S. 53, 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000). 
113. 120 S. Ct. at 2061. 
114. Id. (quoting Wash. Rev. Code§ 26.10.160(3)). 
115. Id. 
116. Id. (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,602 (1979)); see also Gilles, 63 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. at 951-60 (cited in note 70) (examining parents' incentives to act in the best inter-
ests of their children). 
117. 120 S. Ct. at 2062 ("The decisional framework employed by the Superior Court 
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concluded that the visitation order in that case "was an unconsti-
tutional infringement on [the parent's] fundamental right to 
make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her 
two daughters."118 
Troxel's re-affirmation of the right recognized in Pierce is 
particularly noteworthy given that the latter case is-Viteritti 
notwithstanding-increasingly criticized both on children's-
rights and political-theory grounds.119 At the same time, Pierce 
is seen by many as the touchstone for the school-choice question. 
Justice Souter's Troxel concurrence, in particular, was explicit in 
reminding us that education-related decisions are at the heart of 
the liberty protected by Pierce. As he observed, "[T]he strength 
of a parent's interest in controlling a child's associates is as obvi-
ous as the influence of personal associations on the development 
of the child's social and moral character .... Even a State's con-
sidered judgment about the preferable political and religious 
character of schoolteachers is not entitled to prevail over a par-
ent's choice of private school."120 This observation seems true to 
the Court's famous statement in Pierce itself that 
[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all govern-
ments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the 
State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept in-
struction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere 
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his 
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recog-
nize and prepare him for additional obligations. 121 
Troxel-like Pierce-is a challenge and a stumbling block to 
those whose opposition to school choice derives from a com-
mitment to the state's prerogative to employ and standardize 
education as a means of citizen creation and the development of 
a sufficiently "democratic character."122 What's more, though, 
directly contravened the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in the best in-
terest of his or her child"). 
118. Id. at 2063. 
119. See, e.g., Dwyer, Religious Schools v. Children's Rights at 62-101 (cited in note 
39); Greene, 13 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y at 406-08 (cited in note 52) (argu-
ing that Pierce violates key principles of our constitutional structure); Barbara Bennett 
Woodhouse, "Wiza Owns the Child?: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995 (1992). 
120. 120 S. Ct. at 2067 (Souter, J., concurring). 
121. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535. 
122. See, e.g., Gutmann, Democratic Education at 64-70 (cited in note 49) ("The 
problem with voucher plans is not that they leave too much room for parental choice but 
that they leave too little room for democratic deliberation"); Sherry, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
at 160-61 (cited in note 38) ("[L]eaving most educational choices to parents or the de-
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these cases strike me as the basis for a strong moral argument-
just as strong as the equality-based argument that Viteritti roots 
for in Brown-for pluralism and parental choice in education 
and for the autonomy of religious schools.123 The school-choice 
debate is-as Viteritti recognizes (pp. 117-44)-an argument 
about more than education reform; it is also about religious 
freedom.124 
***** 
Viteritti makes a convincing case that school choice need 
not divide the polity nor undermine civil society. Even were he 
mistaken, though, a little bit of balkanization might just be the 
price we pay for allowing individuals to orient their own lives, 
and those of their children, toward the Good as they see it. 
Choosing Equality makes a strong case that school choice would 
advance the cause of equality, but Pierce and Troxel suggest why 
we might support school choice even if Viteritti is wrong. My 
hope is that Viteritti will not be read to argue that instilling and 
shoring up democratic values and public mindedness is a re-
quirement for, and not just a happy side effect of, educational 
choice. 
Viteritti makes the egalitarian argument for educational 
choice with such reasoned and measured passion-as Eugene 
Volokh put it to me, Viteritti is "in your face with a breath 
mint" - that I feel a bit churlish even hesitating before embrac-
ing it. He could well be right-given political realities, particu-
larly when it comes to convincing those predisposed for racial-
justice reasons to be suspicious of educational choice- to believe 
that equality-based arguments for choice are the most compel-
ling. Still, rhetorical force notwithstanding, it's not clear that 
Brown and its "promise" of equality are up to the legal and 
moral work that Viteritti demands. While the themes set out in 
Brown could well carry the day in the courts of public opinion-
and Choosing Equality is an excellent brief for those courts-
mocratic process ... assumes, probably erroneously, that parents ... will not make seri-
ous, virtue-threatening, education-stifling mistakes"). 
123. The "parentalist" argument for parental choice and control in education has 
been put in play by others. See generally, e.g., Gilles, Liberal Parentalism and Children's 
Educational Rights (cited in note 104); Gilles, Liberal Parentalism and Children's Educa-
tional Rights (cited in note 70). But see Dwyer, Religious Schools v. Children's Rights at 
62-101 (cited in note 39). 
124. See Carter, 27 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 1205 (cited in note 39) ("[W]hat Pierce ul-
timately represents is the judgment that in order to take religious freedom seriously, we 
must take the ability of parents to raise their children in their religion seriously"). 
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religious schools and parents would do well in the meantime to 
guard jealously the liberty guaranteed in Pierce. 
